The optimal prepayment model asserts that rational homeowners would re¯nance if they can reduce the current value of their liabilities by an amount greater than the re¯nancing threshold, de¯ned as the cost of carrying the transaction plus the time value of the embedded call option. To compute the notional value of the re¯nancing threshold, researchers have traditionally relied on a discrete option-pricing model. Using a unique loan level dataset that links homeowner attributes with property and loan characteristics, this study proposes an alternative approach of estimating the implied value of the re¯nancing threshold. This empirical method enables us to measure the minimum interest rate di®erential needed to justify re¯nancing conditional on the borrower's creditworthiness, remaining maturity, and other observable characteristics.
INTRODUCTION
When options are bundled with debt instruments { as in call options on bonds or prepayment options on mortgages { the decision to exercise is often bundled with other nancing decisions. Calling existing debt typically involves issuing new debt as well, and so the cost-bene¯t calculus will encompass several related steps rather than an isolated transaction. Accordingly, the value of a mortgage option and the likelihood of its exercise may depend not only on option-theoretic considerations (e.g., strike and market prices, expected price volatility, discount rate, and time-to-expiration) but also on factors speci¯c to the individual debtor's availability and cost of replacement funding, including transaction costs. One way of quantifying the importance of these factors is by their impact on the required threshold values of gains to be reaped by re¯nancing. At one extreme, with zero transactions costs and no change in the terms and availability of replacement funding, a pure options-theoretic model of exercise may be appropriate, with only time-value considerations limiting the exercise of in-the-money re¯nancing options. Toward the opposite extreme, credit downgrade, collateral deterioration, or high transactions cost could raise the required threshold gain from re¯nancing, impeding such activity. This paper develops a way to compute re¯nancing thresholds for¯xed-rate home mortgage loans, based on actual homeowner re¯nancing behavior and conditional on individual characteristics and market conditions. Our approach is to estimate a model of conditional re¯nancing probabilities, and then, consistent with option-theoretic considerations, to locate thresholds based on where the impact of market volatility on re¯nancing probabilities is optimized.
One type of approach to understanding re¯nancing thresholds is to simulate optimizing behavior under various assumptions. At the simplest level, some¯nancial advisors may compute re¯nancing costs and develop rules of thumb about how many basis points a homeowner should save to justify re¯nancing. At the other extreme of complexity, some studies have used carefully detailed binomial techniques to compute re¯nancing rules, which for example may be sensitive to factors such as market volatility conditions (e.g., Such rules are \normative" in that they provide thresholds that would be optimal given a set of debtor objectives and constraints. A drawback is that such a methodology may miss unobserved transactions costs or other idiosyncratic factors a®ecting re¯nancing decisions { a particularly important consideration for home mortgages. Thus, while highly instructive, normative simulation results must be viewed with a degree of caution by investors, bankers, loan servicers, and others concerned with predicting how re¯nancings or prepayments will actually develop.
As a \positive" approach, our study estimates thresholds implied by actual observed household behavior. Our technique is to take advantage of the expectation that a change in mortgage rate volatility will have its greatest impact on re¯nancing decisions of individuals whose costs and bene¯ts of re¯nancing are nearly balanced { e.g., who are \at their thresholds". These vega thresholds are computed from a su±ciently well-speci¯ed statistical model that the size of the thresholds can be made conditional on individual characteristics and mortgage market conditions.
In the next section, we formalize the theory of the option vega. We illustrate that fundamentally the vega of any option (including that of a mortgage option) attains a maximum when it is near the money. In section 3, we demonstrate how this property of the mortgage option can be applied in a statistical context. In particular, we illustrate that there is a direct relationship between the vega of the mortgage option and the probability of re¯nancing. In section 4, we use this methodology to estimate the re¯nancing threshold needed to justify re¯nancing for di®erent values of volatility, maturity, and household creditworthiness.
THE VEGA THRESHOLD
The right to prepay a mortgage is equivalent to a call option that allows a homeowner to re¯nance all future obligations of the mortgage loan at the outstanding balance of the loan. Like any other call option, the mortgage option depends on several factors: the contract interest rate, which determines the intrinsic value of the loan; the volatility of the risk-free interest rate process; the remaining maturity of the loan, etc. An important problem in the mortgage re¯nance literature is¯nding the e®ective interest rate di®eren-tial between contract rates that can justify re¯nancing. This interest rate di®erential is essentially equivalent to the point at which the mortgage option goes in the money.
For most typical option contracts (e.g., calls or puts on stock or bond assets), moneyness is easily established because the strike price and current asset price are transparent.
Mortgages, however, are more complex options that are in°uenced by other esoteric factors. An alternative way to infer the moneyness of the option is to look at how the value of option responds to changes in the underlying factors. In particular, in this study we consider the sensitivity of the value of the option to changes in volatility | the vega of the option. From hedging analysis, we know that shifts in market volatility have their strongest e®ect on option values when options are near the money (for more details, see Hull 1993 ). In the appendix, we show analytically that this property holds for a variety of European option contracts. More speci¯cally, we demonstrate that the vega of a European call option reaches a maximum at
Here, S ¤ represents the vega threshold (that is, the asset price at which the vega attains a maximum), (X) denotes the strike price of the option, (r) is the risk-free rate, and (T ¡ t)
is the time-to-expiration. For the seller of the option, this value represents essentially the future value of the proceeds, adjusted for the risk of uncertainty.
The Vega of the Mortgage Option
The option-pricing theory of a¯xed-rate mortgage has been extensively studied in the mortgage¯nance literature (see Archer, Ling, and McGill 1996; Follain, Scott and Yang 1992 . For a graphical illustration of the mortgage option see also Quigley and Van Order 1990 ). Let P (T; t; r 0 ) represent the face value of a callable mortgage loan at period (t)
with an original contract rate (r 0 ) and maturity (T) months. Similarly, P (T; t; r m ) denotes the value of the same loan but discounted at the prevailing market rate (r m ). The debtor maximizing his or her net worth would re¯nance when the following inequality holds:
where (TC) stands for the total cost of the re¯nancing transaction. However, we also need to recognize the value of the embedded option. Because a mortgage is callable, its value can be expressed as the sum of a noncallable amortizing bond, or annuity, minus the value of the mortgage call, that is, P (T; t; r) = P NC (T; t; r) ¡ V (T; t; ¾; r). Transactions costs conceptually include all economic costs associated with carrying out the re¯nancing, both the repayment of outstanding debt and issuance of new debt. In the case of a home mortgage, there may be time and money costs associated with paying back the loan, particularly if there were prepayment fees or legal expenses. Most of the total transaction cost, however, is typically associated with securing the replacement¯nancing. This will include points and fees, legal expenses, transaction taxes, plus the \shoe leather" and time of the debtor. To account for this broad range of re¯nancing costs and the embedded value of the call option, we modify the right hand side of equation (2):
where the variable (p) represents points and fees, (c) de¯nes the credit quality of the borrower, and (`) the loan-to-value ratio. The term º(T; t; ¾) equals the net value of the call option, i. Figure 1 presents the vega of the mortgage option for three di®erent mortgage contracts (2-year, 5-year, and 10-year). Besides maturity, the remaining characteristics of the three mortgage contracts are identical. 1 The vega threshold, plotted on the x-axis, represents the di®erence present value of the mortgage and the book value of the original 1 We computed the value of the mortgage call by adapting the Rendleman and Bartter balance (measured as a percent). The relationship between the mortgage option vega and the intrinsic value is concave and is fundamentally similar to that of the European stock option discussed in the appendix. Note that the vega of the 10-year mortgage option attains a maximum at a higher threshold, re°ecting the fact that value of the mortgage call increases with maturity.
As seen from equation (3), an important element in mortgage options is transaction cost, not a factor in simple options pricing models but central in mortgage re¯nancings.
Consider for a moment the notion of a mortgage re¯nancing option in the absence of transaction costs. Any movement of market rates below the mortgage coupon rate could trigger instantaneous re¯nancing. The debtor's own uncertainty or forecast about future mortgage rates would not matter to his re¯nancing decision, given the level of market rates.
Transactions costs, however, cause the debtor to limit the frequency of his re¯nancing.
Interest rate uncertainty becomes important within this framework, since, for example, it provides more expected return to waiting before incurring the¯xed transaction cost. given spread between coupon and market rates, a higher expected volatility should reduce the current likelihood of re¯nancing rather than waiting.
of the 2-year mortgage with a face value of $100 and zero transaction costs (the solid curve in Figure 1 ) and the vega of a 2-year mortgage option with a transaction costs of $0.60.
As expected, higher transaction costs lower the value of the mortgage call. At the same time, the vega threshold rises, re°ecting the additional cost of re¯nancing.
For at-the-money mortgage options, it must hold that the intrinsic value is equal to the re¯nancing threshold. To illustrate this property in mortgages consider again the numerical example presented in Figure 2 . From the binomial tree simulations, we can calculate the actual at-the-money value of the call to be $0.195 when transaction costs are
zero. An alternative way to approximate the value of call option is to¯nd the maximum of the vega, which identi¯es the point at which the call is at the money. From the¯gure, we observe that the vega peaks around $0.210. Since transaction costs are zero, this number can serve as an alternative estimate for the actual value of the option.
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When transaction costs are set equal to 60 cents, the binomial estimate of the at-themoney value of the call is $0.051. Looking at the¯gure again, we¯nd that in this case the vega reaches a maximum around $0.655 (the estimate of the re¯nancing threshold).
The vega estimate for the value of the option is therefore $0.655-$0.6=$0.055. In short,
we have demonstrated that a simple approach to locating the re¯nancing threshold would be to¯nd where the mortgage vega peaks in absolute value. These peaks should depend in part on the individual household's characteristics that a®ect its transaction costs. In the following discussion, we will develop an approach to empirically identifying these vega threshold values.
We have illustrated above that the (negative) e®ect of interest rate volatility on re¯-nancing probability will be strongest for loans where the costs and bene¯ts of re¯nancing are close to balance (or, more precisely, where they are just tipped in favor of re¯nanc-ing). At that point, the downside risk of postponing the transaction is very limited and little a®ected by increased volatility. At that same point, however, the expected gain from waiting is clearly increased by heighten volatility. Further away from the re¯nancing threshold, where the net bene¯t of re¯nancing is greater, the asymmetry of the upside and downside volatility e®ects becomes diluted. Away from the threshold, the expected loss from scenarios in which rates go back up is greater. Indeed, if rates stand su±ciently far below the current coupon, re¯nancing will be overwhelmingly attractive, and the in°uence of volatility will be correspondingly trivial.
In the next section, we will show that this logic is complicated only slightly by the fact that higher volatility will also increase the attractiveness of the prepayment option on the replacement¯nancing. The (positive) e®ect of market volatility on this replacement option will be re°ected as an increase in the option-adjusted spread charged in the market.
The option on the pre-existing loan, in contrast, also increases in value to the debtor, but its cost is locked in as long as he does not re¯nance. Since it is well out of the money, the e®ect of volatility on the value of the replacement option should be considerably smaller than the e®ect of volatility on the fair value of the existing option. On balance, after controlling for the partial e®ect of volatility on the di®erence between existing and current market mortgage rates, the remaining independent e®ect of volatility on the re¯nancing probability will be negative and strongest for loans very near their re¯nancing thresholds.
A STATISTICAL MODEL OF MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT
The theoretical mortgage option model considered above can be modi¯ed into an econometric speci¯cation. The net bene¯t from re¯nancing is in°uenced by a broad range of factors: the intrinsic value of the mortgage, the time value of the call, and a variety of frictional costs that may stem from the borrower's credit quality or available equity in the property. Let B ¤ ti represent the net bene¯t from re¯nancing for the i-th individual in month (t). Consistent with equation (3), we can de¯ne the net bene¯t from re¯nancing as:
Although B ¤ ti is not directly observable, we observe a vector x ti¢ that includes the factors that determine the net bene¯t of re¯nancing (e.g., the volatility, remaining maturity, original and prevailing mortgage rates, creditworthiness, etc.). We can therefore express the net bene¯t from re¯nancing as a function of these explanatory variables, of the general
where g(¢) allows for the possibility that the e®ect of x ti¢ may be nonlinear, and the random error ² ti measures unobserved idiosyncratic net costs or bene¯ts to individual homeowners.
De¯ne y ti to be a binary variable: estimate the rate at which an event will occur given that it has not occurred until that point in time. In the current framework, however, we use a discrete-choice model because, as will be shown in the next section, the marginal e®ects of this speci¯cation are more consistent with option theory.
The probability of prepayment in a given month can be de¯ned as:
SMM ti = P (i ¡ th homeowner prepays in month (t)) = P (y ti = 1) = ¤(x ti¢¯) (6) where ¤(¢) represents the logistic cumulative distribution function. This monthly prepayment measure is usually referred to in the mortgage¯nance literature as the single monthly mortality rate (SMM).
Inferring the Vega from a Prepayment Probability
The logistic regression estimates the e®ect of the call option indirectly through the relationship between volatility and the probability of re¯nancing. We will argue, however, that the marginal e®ect of volatility on the probability of re¯nancing relates to the underlying vega of the call option. It is worth noting that within this framework the prepayment vega | where the e®ects of volatility on the probability of re¯nancing is greatest | can be understood as corresponding to the point where the e®ects of volatility on the net bene¯ts of re¯nancing are greatest. To see how, consider the probability of prepayment, measured as a single monthly mortality
where (x) includes all exogenous variables a®ecting the probability of re¯nancing besides the net value of the call. We assume that F (¢) is a continuous di®erentiable function.
Applying the chain rule, we can show that ceteris paribus
such that F ¾ is the derivative of F (¢) with respect to ¾. Here, we expect that F ¾ is negative.
Equation (7) shows that the sensitivity of the monthly prepayment to changes in volatility (hereafter, referred to as prepayment vega) is proportional to the vega of the call option.
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In turn, this result suggests that the prepayment vega (now a convex function) should achieve a minimum when the option to re¯nance is roughly at the money. Consequently, one can view a prepayment vega in the same way as an option vega.
In the logit model, the marginal e®ect of volatility is
where g ¾ denotes the partial derivative of g(¢) with respect to ¾ and ¤(¢) represents the logistic cumulative distribution. A property of the binary choice models (logit or probit)
is that the marginal e®ect of volatility takes a functional form that is consistent with the properties of the option vega. An interesting special case is the linear logit model, that is, g(x ti¢¯) = x ti¢¯. We can show in this case that the prepayment vega attains a minimum when the probability of prepayment is 0.5 (e.g., ¤(x ti¢¯) = 0:5). The vega of the new option is very small because the new option is basically deep out of the money. 5 In the linear case, equation (8) reduces to À =¯¾¤(1 ¡ ¤), where¯¾ represents the case, a mortgage holder is considered to be at the money when the likelihood of re¯nancing equals 0:5. While this simple case is appealing, we prefer the more general nonlinear specication, which allows the threshold location and the corresponding re¯nancing probability at that turning point to be determined more°exibly.
Estimating the Re¯nancing Threshold: Some Adjustments
Since the prepayment vega is expected to be greatest near the point where the costs and bene¯ts of re¯nancing are balanced, we should be able to approximate this threshold by observing where volatility has its largest impact on the re¯nancing probability. Using an appropriately speci¯ed statistical model, we can estimate the vega threshold as a function of the variables that determine re¯nancings.
The intrinsic value of the mortgage plays a key role in determining the vega threshold.
As shown above, this measure computes the noncallable value of the loan using the contract rate on the existing loan (r 0 ) and the prevailing market rate (r m ). Richard and Roll (1989) propose a simple measure of the intrinsic value. The authors note that, since a mortgage obligation is an annuity, the intrinsic worth of a mortgage is given by the ratio of the two annuities, that is,
where d(r; T; t) = [1 ¡ (1 + r) t¡T ]=r. For all observations in our sample, the original rate for the i-th owner (r 0i ) is measured by the national average commitment (contract) rate on¯xed rate loans for the month the loan was closed. This is the so-called A paper rate or the rate available to the best credit risks. Similarly, the prevailing market rate for the i-th mortgage holder at month (t) (r mti ) is also the national average A paper contract rate at month (t).
marginal of g(x ti¢¯) with respect to ¾. Since¯¾ is a negative constant, the prepayment vega À is minimized when ¤ = 0:5.
Using the Richard-Roll measure, we rearrange (3) above, such that all variables that are directly observable are on the left hand side of the decision rule:
where T C(p ti ) represents the points and fees paid by the borrower. Dividing both sides of the equation by d(r 0i ; T; t), we obtain
or
The re¯nancing hurdle h ti depends on credit, collateral, option replacement cost, and other variables, and I ti denotes the intrinsic value of re¯nancing, net of points and fees.
A borrower is at the money when I ti equals h ti . A simple estimate of this at-the-money threshold h ti is given by:ĥ
where À(x ti¢¯) is de¯ned by equation (8) . In turn, the actual re¯nancing hurdle can be estimated byĤ ti = T C(c ti ;`t i ) + V (T; t; ¾ ti ) = d(r 0i ; T; t)ĥ ti :
Note that the estimatorĤ ti does not distinguish the di®erent parts of the re¯nancing hurdle. However, one can separate out the value of the call option from the transaction cost 6 In our case, we fully observe the intrinsic value of the mortgage ® ti and the transaction cost of points and fees p ti . Although we have information on credit ratings and home equity, we cannot directly determine the related transaction costs. Of course, if these costs (e.g.,
T C(c ti ) and T C(`t i )) were also well-de¯ned, they can be subtracted from the intrinsic value as well.
by choosing certain convenient simulation scenarios. We know for instance that borrowers who are not credit-or collateral-constrained are not likely to pay a transaction premium (other than customary points and fees), meaning that the transaction costs T C(c ti ;`t i ) would be small. As a result,Ĥ ti would measure primarily the option replacement cost.
Similarly, we expect the value of the option replacement cost to be negligible if volatility is small. Thus,Ĥ ti would most likely represent the cost of inadequate collateral or credit when volatility is small.
The process of estimating the implicit re¯nancing hurdled faced by any holder of a mortgage option can summarized in four key steps:
Step 1: Calculate the net intrinsic value of the mortgage I ti from equation (10).
Step 2: Use I ti along with a measure of volatility and other explanatory variables to estimate a nonlinear version of the logit model for re¯nancing (equation (5)). Although the functional form of g(x ti¢¯) is arbitrary, it should be°exible enough to capture the interaction of volatility with all other independent variables.
Step 3: Given the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameter vector¯, generate simulated values of the prepayment vega À(x ti¢¯) (equation (8)) for di®erent scenarios of volatility, loan maturity, credit quality, and home equity.
Step 4: Identify the minimum value of the prepayment vega and solve for the implicit value of the re¯nancing hurdle (equations (12) and (13)).
RESULTS

Data and Model Speci¯cation
The data was provided by the Mortgage Research Group (MRG) of Jersey City, New
Jersey, which entered into a strategic alliance with TRW a large national credit bureau.
Our¯nal sample includes about 13,000 transactions from these four geographic regions We apply the four-step procedure outlined in the previous section to our sample of mortgage re¯nancings. The logit model is estimated using a nonlinear speci¯cation, which consists of higher polynomial powers and cross-product terms of the exogenous information. 7 This speci¯cation is quite useful in capturing the nonlinear aspects of the call option. In the logit model, the binary dependent variable y ti represents the decision to re¯nance (one if the mortgage is re¯nanced and zero otherwise). The explanatory vector x ti¢ includes: (1) the intrinsic value of the mortgage (® ti ); (2) interest rate volatility 7 This speci¯cation is similar to a Taylor expansion approximation. Suppose that the explanatory vector includes K variables (x 1 ; : : : ; x K ). The nonlinear speci¯cation employed in our analysis is:
measured by the implied volatility of the option price of a 10-year Treasury note futures contract (¾ ¶ t ); (3) TRW credit rating measure of the homeowner (c ti ); (4) post-origination loan-to-value ratio (`t i ); (5) point and fees (as percent of loan value) (6) age of the loan (¿ ti ); and (7) size of the mortgage loan (s ti ).
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Estimates of the nonlinear model used in simulations are more di±cult to interpret and are therefore not presented in this paper. Table 1 , however, summarizes the linear logit speci¯cation. The results of the linear speci¯cation strongly support the view that a homeowner's decision to re¯nanced is in°uenced by the intrinsic value of the mortgage.
In particular, the coe±cient on the annuity ratio ® ti is positive and highly signi¯cant. As expected, the e®ect of points and fees is negative and strongly signi¯cant, con¯rming that higher transaction costs raise the re¯nancing hurdle faced by homeowners. The current loan-to-value ratio coe±cient is negative and very signi¯cant. A strong statistical signi¯-cance of loan-to-value signi¯es that homeowners with insu±cient collateral are unable to prepay their mortgage loan even if economic conditions are in their favor. These results bolster the¯ndings of Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) and Archer, Ling, McGill (1996), 8 In computing the net intrinsic value of the mortgage, we assume an existing mortgage rate r 0i and a current market rate r mti at which the borrower can re¯nance. In practice, households can choose from a menu of mortgage rates and points. This creates a problem in comparing the coupon rate on the existing loan the currently prevailing market rate.
To deal with this potential inconsistency, we estimated r 0i by the average Fredie Mac commitment rate on a 30-year¯xed-rate mortgages for the month that the loan was initially closed. Similarly, we estimated r mti by the commitment rate for the month that the loan was re¯nanced. Finally, transaction costs are measured by points and fees charges on conventional¯xed-rate loans closed. This monthly series is compiled by the Federal Housing Finance Board.
who also¯nd evidence that home equity is a critical factor in the decision to re¯nance.
Finally, to a lesser extent, the linear model suggests that a borrower's creditworthiness has also an adverse e®ect on the probability of re¯nancing.
An important¯nding of our analysis is that the marginal e®ect of volatility on the likelihood of prepayment is negative. The negative relationship is key to our empirical analysis because without it the prepayment vegas would not be convex. This result a±rms that the value of the call increases when the volatility of the noncallable asset is expected to rise. Higher expected volatility encourages borrowers to postpone re¯nancing because the bene¯t from waiting to re¯nance would be greater in the future.
Estimates of the Re¯nancing Threshold
The logit model is estimated for three di®erent expected holding period scenarios: The re¯nancing threshold also depends on credit quality and collateral value. Note that the e®ect of collateral is magni¯ed at higher holding periods. At a 15-years holding horizon, a homeowner with a loan-to-value ratio of 100 percent has to pay 50 basis points more in re¯nancing costs than the typical homeowner. This \surcharge" further rises to 80 basis points for a loan maturing in 30 years. This big jump in costs, however, should not be construed that a homeowner with a 30-year loan is at a handicap. Table 3 recalculates the re¯nancing threshold in terms of the coupon spread between the original mortgage rate r 0 and the prevailing market rate r m . 9 As seen from the table, the coupon rate di®erential 9 At this coupon spread, the net present value of the mortgage is equal to the re¯-nancing threshold (see equation (9)). This point represents the minimum interest rate di®erential that can justify re¯nancing. In our calculations, we assume: the average age of the mortgage loan is t = 4 years; the average cost of points and fees p ti is 2 percent (as a percent of loan value); and the original coupon rate is 10 percent, which is the average contract rate of the sample.
needed to trigger a prepayment is larger for shorter maturities. Our¯ndings also a±rm the importance of interest rate uncertainty as the coupon spread needed to justify re¯nancing rises with the level of implied volatility. Overall, we¯nd that a delinquency would add about 6 basis points to the homeowner's mortgage rate. 10 Furthermore, a collateralconstrained borrower would have to pay about 10 basis points more for re¯nancing than the average homeowner.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper develops a method of computing the thresholds at which individuals will re¯nance mortgage loan. In e®ect, we measure how large a change in the present value of the debt is required to make it worth the expense of carrying out the transaction, conditional not only on market conditions but on individual borrower characteristics as well. Since re¯nancing has considerable transactions costs, including the cost of securing new funding, the exercise of the re¯nancing option will depend on a variety of factors outside the standard option valuation theory. How large the threshold is for a particular household, for instance, will depend on its credit rating and its available collateral. Similar principles would apply for businesses.
To compute these conditional thresholds, we take advantage of the prediction from option theory that volatility will have its largest e®ect when an option is near the money.
Furthermore, we show that this point of the largest e®ect corresponds to a state where the conditional probability of re¯nancing exceeds a critical value. We estimate logit equa- 10 On the surface, the e®ect of credit appears to be small. We should note, however, that the credit variable used in our analysis represents the worst ever rating across all credit lines some of which (for example, retail derogatories) are deemed as less°agrant.
Although the worst ever snap shot is a conservative measure that may underestimate the importance of credit, it is nevertheless more reliable than other reported measures.
credit ratings, collateral values,¯nancing points and fees, and other household and market data. We locate the re¯nancing spreads at which the e®ect of volatility on re¯nancing probabilities is optimized. These are the re¯nancing thresholds, and they vary in size as expected conditional on the credit, collateral, remaining maturity, and other measurable characteristics. In short, we are able to compute in a positive (as opposed to normative) manner how large a spread it takes to precipitate re¯nancings for di®erent categories of homeowners.
APPENDIX The Vega of a European Call
Consider a simple European call option on a zero-coupon bond or stock. In the Black-Scholes framework, the value of the call depends on the current asset price (S), the maturity date (T), the strike price (X), the underlying risk-free interest rate (r), and the volatility of the price of bond (¾). Mathematically, V E (S; T; t; r; ¾). Although the strike price X may not be observable, we can determine the moneyness of an option by considering its sensitivity to changes in volatility. This approach is applied extensively in designing optimally hedged portfolios. The value of an option is positively related to the volatility of the underlying asset. The e®ect of volatility, however, is strongest when the option is near the money. In the Black-Scholes case, the partial derivative of the value of the call with respect to volatility (the vega) is equal to
where Á(¢) represents the standard normal density function and z is a vector of other factors other than volatility a®ecting the call value (see Hull (1993) ). Figure A1 NOTES: DUM-NY, DUM-IL, DUM-FL are dummy variables indicating loans in New York, Illinois, and Florida, respectively; ® ti = intrinsic value of the mortgage loan; p ti = points and fees (as percent of the loan value);`t i = current loan-to-value ratio (percent); c ti is the worst delinquency ever; ¾ ¶ represents the implied price volatility on options on the 10-year treasury note futures (basis points); ¿ ti = age of the loan (in months) ; s ti = logarithm of original loan balance. The symbols (¤ ¤ ¤), (¤¤), and (¤) indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. NOTES:`t i represents the current loan-to-value ratio (percent); c ti is the worst delinquency ever (GOOD=unblemished credit, POOR=homeowner has defaulted); ¾ ¶ represents the implied price volatility on options on the 10-year treasury note futures (basis points). 
